Welfare properties of strategic R&D investments in Hotelling models

被引:11
|
作者
Matsumura, Toshihiro [2 ]
Matsushima, Noriaki [1 ]
机构
[1] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Osaka 5670047, Japan
[2] Univ Tokyo, Inst Social Sci, Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 1130033, Japan
关键词
R&D; Spatial competition; Welfare; PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES; COMPETITION; COLLUSION; EQUILIBRIA;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.106
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In linear-city models, if firms are allowed (not allowed) to locate outside the linear city, they engage in excessive (insufficient) R&D investments from the normative viewpoint. This implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:465 / 468
页数:4
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