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Corporate governance and risk-taking
被引:1393
|作者:
John, Kose
[1
]
Litov, Lubomir
[2
]
Yeung, Bernard
[1
]
机构:
[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10003 USA
[2] Washington Univ, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
来源:
关键词:
D O I:
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk-taking for their self-interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk-taking. Using a cross-country panel and a U.S.-only sample, we find that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.
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页码:1679 / 1728
页数:50
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