The European Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond Markets

被引:53
|
作者
De Grauwe, Paul [1 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
monetary union; central bank; sovereign debt crisis; lender of last resort; self-fulfilling equilibria;
D O I
10.1093/cesifo/ift012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The sovereign debt crisis has made it clear that central banking is more than keeping inflation low. Central banks are also responsible for financial stability. An essential tool in maintaining financial stability is provided by the capacity of the central bank to be the lender of last resort in the banking system. In this article, I argue that the ECB should also be the lender of last resort in the government bond markets of the monetary union, very much like the central banks in countries that issue debt in their own currencies are. This is necessary to prevent countries from being pushed into bad equilibria by self-fulfilling fears of liquidity crises in a monetary union. The ECB decided to take on this role in 2012. I evaluate this decision and I discuss the different arguments formulated by those who oppose this new role of the ECB. (JEL codes: E2, E5, and F4).
引用
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页码:520 / 535
页数:16
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