Do Information Rents in Loan Spreads Persist over the Business Cycles?

被引：12
|
作者：
Mattes, Julian A. [1 ]
Steffen, Sascha [2 ]
Wahrenburg, Mark [1 ]
机构：
[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany
[2] ESMT European Sch Management & Technol, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH | 2013年 / 43卷 / 02期
关键词：
Syndicated loans; Hold-up; Lending relationships; Business cycle; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; MONETARY-POLICY; BANK LOANS; CREDIT; COSTS; DEBT; COMPETITION; STANDARDS; MARKET;
D O I：
10.1007/s10693-012-0129-z
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for information rents in loan spreads by analyzing a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the period from 1996 to 2005. We use various measures for borrower opaqueness and control for bank, borrower and loan characteristics and we find that undercapitalized banks charge approximately 34 bps higher loan spreads for loans to opaque borrowers. We further analyze whether this effect persists throughout the business cycle and find that this effect prevails only during recessions. However, we do not find evidence that banks exploit their information monopolies during expansion phases.
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页码：175 / 195
页数：21
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