Tarski and Carnap on logical truth - Or: What is genuine logic?

I came to the topic of the title in connection with my logical investigations of the Is-Ought problem in multimodal logics (Schurz 1997). There are infinitely many mathematically possible modal logics. Are they all philosophically serious candidates? Which modal logic the "right" one - does such a question make sense? A similar question can be raised for the infinite variety of propositional logics weaker than classical logics. The Vienna Circle concept of logic was that logic holds merely by form, independently from the facts of the world. Have we lost this concept completely? Is it a matter of arbitrary choice, of mere subjective-practical appropriateness, which logic one chooses? Is Quine right that there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic truth, even if we take "analytic truth" in the narrow sense of "logical truth"? These are the questions which have motivated this paper. Tarski as well as Carnap have tried to define a sharp borderline between logical versus extralogical truths, and logical versus extralogical concepts. Both attempts are complementary in several respects. To some extent, this paper can also be seen as describing a game between Tarski and Carnap, which we call the Tarski-Carnap-game, in short the T-C-game. Section II constitutes Round 1 of the T-C-game and goes to Tarski, section TV is Round 2 and goes to Carnap, section VII is Round 3 and goes again to Tarski, finally section VIII is Round 4 which goes to Carnap. So the Tarski-Carnap-game ends 2:2, draw - which is as it has to be, of course. The other sections of the paper reflect on the contemporary discussion of 'genuine logic' and present some own suggestions.