Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

被引：11
|
作者：
Kitamura, Hiroshi [1 ]
Matsushima, Noriaki [2 ]
Sato, Misato [3 ]
机构：
[1] Kyoto Sangyo Univ, Fac Econ, Kita Ku, Kyoto, Kyoto 6038555, Japan
[2] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Mihogaoka 6-1, Ibaraki, Osaka 5670047, Japan
[3] Osaka Univ, Osaka Sch Int Publ Policy, 1-3 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 5600043, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2017年 / 151卷
关键词：
Antitrust policy; Entry deterrence; Exclusive contracts; Nash bargaining; NAKED EXCLUSION; DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION; ENTRY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.021
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：1 / 3
页数：3
相关论文
共 50 条
12345