We show that a non-Bayesian learning procedure leads to very permissive implementation results concerning the efficient allocation of resources in a dynamic environment where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents' values. This contrasts the rather restrictive results that have been obtained for Bayesian learning in the same environment, and highlights the role of the learning procedure in dynamic mechanism design problems. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ Auckland, Dept Econ, Sir Owen G Glenn Bldg,Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New ZealandUniv Auckland, Dept Econ, Sir Owen G Glenn Bldg,Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
Hillas, John
Samet, Dov
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Tel Aviv Univ, Coller Sch Management, Tel Aviv, IsraelUniv Auckland, Dept Econ, Sir Owen G Glenn Bldg,Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
机构:
Brown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USABrown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA
de Clippel, Geoffroy
Zhang, Xu
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol Guangzhou, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaBrown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA