Judicial Independence as a Constitutional Principle in the EU: ⟪The Limits of Control⟫ by the Court of Justice?

The recent case law of the CJEU on Article 19 TEU has confirmed time and again the extremely broad material scope of this provision. At the same time, taking into account the very broad prerogatives of national judges to refer preliminary questions to the Court, it becomes clear that, at least potentially, almost all elements of national judicial systems having a connection with judicial independence can end up in a way or another before the Luxembourg Court. After some initial developments that forecasted that admissibility requirements in preliminary ruling cases could play a true limitative role, more recent rulings make apparent that the Court has turned back to a relatively flexible and open position with regard to the `relevance criterion'. The scope of application and potential impact in national judicial systems of Article 19 TUE outside the scope of the crisis of the Rule of Law emerges therefore as the crucial question to be solved by the CJEU.