Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off

被引：36
|
作者：
Anukriti, S. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Boston Coll, Dept Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
[2] IZA, Bonn, Germany
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS | 2018年 / 10卷 / 02期
关键词：
SON PREFERENCE; MISSING GIRLS; GENDER BIAS; INDIA; DECLINE; KOREA; COUNTRY; CHINA; WOMEN; ASIA;
D O I：
10.1257/app.20150234
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the ility-sex ratio conflict.
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页码：27 / 57
页数：31
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