Enterprise Risk Management Adoption and Managerial Incentives

被引:0
|
作者
Altuntas, Muhammed [1 ]
Berry-Stolzle, Thomas R. [2 ]
Hoyt, Robert E. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Dept Risk Management & Insurance, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[2] Univ Iowa, Tippie Coll Business, 108 John Pappajohn Business Bldg S230, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
[3] Univ Georgia, Terry Coll Business, A405 Moore Rooker Hall, Athens, GA 30602 USA
关键词
Enterprise risk management; hedging; career concerns; managerial incentives; AGENCY PROBLEMS; CAREER CONCERNS; CEO TURNOVER; HEDGE FUND; OWNERSHIP; PROPERTY; PERFORMANCE; STOCK; DIVERSIFICATION; DETERMINANTS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is the approach of managing all risks faced by a firm in an integrated, holistic fashion. This research analyzes factors that influence a firm's decision to start an ERM program. Our comprehensive survey data of German property-liability insurance companies allows us to construct direct measures of ERM program adoption and ERM quality. We find that negative changes in past firm performance increase a firm's probability to adopt ERM and are accompanied by significant improvements in the quality of a firm's risk management process. Furthermore, these effects are stronger for firms that would be expected to have relatively high forced CEO turnover rates after periods of bad performance, supporting the prediction of the career concerns view and consistent with managerial incentives generally. Skilled managers concerned about keeping their jobs should reduce the volatility of a firm's earnings after a period of poor performance, and ERM adoption can help achieve that goal.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 42
页数:42
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