Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners' dilemma games: an experimental test

被引:76
|
作者
Sabater-Grande, G [1 ]
Georgantzis, N
机构
[1] Univ Jaume 1 Castellon, Dept Econ, Castellon de La Plana 123071, Spain
[2] LINEEX Valencia, Castellon de La Plana 123071, Spain
关键词
risk aversion; discount factor; repeated prisoners' dilemma;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00223-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players' behavior in repeated prisoners' dilemma games. Faced with quantitatively equal discount factors, the most risk-averse players will choose Nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way. Overall, we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:37 / 50
页数:14
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