Two stages credit evaluation in bank loan appraisal

被引:10
|
作者
Chen, Yenpao [1 ]
Guo, Ruey-Ji [1 ]
Huang, Rao-Li
机构
[1] Soochow Univ, Dept Accounting, Taipei 100, Taiwan
关键词
Bank lending process; Two stage credit evaluation; Loan screening; Trigger cost; Asymmetric information; EQUILIBRIA; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2008.05.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Traditionally, banks conduct standard credit evaluation such as credit scoring following the receipt of loan request and make the accept/reject decision accordingly. This research explores the possibility of two stages credit evaluation in lending process. When the evaluation cost drops below the trigger cost, it pays to conduct the second-stage loan appraisal. We derive two trigger cost thresholds for borrowers who are rated as credible and default in the first stage, respectively. Contingent on the share of good borrowers relative to the bad ones, the optimal strategy of the bank can be differentiated to implement second-stage evaluation on either (I) both types, or (2) only one type, or (3) neither type of the borrowers. We find that during severe economic contractions or in geographic areas/industries Which are in deep troubles, whilst the borrowers who repay the loan are out-numbered by the borrowers who fail to pay, the trigger cost for good borrower is higher than that of default borrower. in this scenario, the banks are more inclined to undertake the second-stage credit evaluation on good borrowers. On the other hand, if the percentage of credible borrowers is higher than that of default borrowers, the trigger cost for good borrower lies below the trigger cost of default borrower. As a result, the banks are less inclined to undertake the second-stage evaluation on good borrowers. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:63 / 70
页数:8
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