Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets

被引：8
|
作者：
Raff, H [1 ]
Schmitt, N
机构：
[1] Univ Kiel, Int Volkswirtschaftslehre, D-24098 Kiel, Germany
[2] Simon Fraser Univ, Dept Econ, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada
[3] Univ Geneva, Dept Econ Polit, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
来源：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 68卷 / 02期
关键词：
international trade; exclusive dealing; common agency; vertical restraints; competition policy;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high, domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised be prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：485 / 503
页数：19
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