Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements

被引:2
|
作者
Kiyotaki, Fumi [1 ]
Miyakawa, Toshiji [2 ]
机构
[1] Kinki Univ, Fac Econ, Higashiosaka, Osaka 5778502, Japan
[2] Osaka Univ Econ, Fac Econ, Higashiyodogawa Ku, Osaka 5338533, Japan
关键词
NETWORKS; TRANSFERS; BLOCS; AREAS;
D O I
10.1111/roie.12053
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a dynamic noncooperative bargaining game with a random proposer. We show that global free trade (a grand coalition) does not necessarily occur unless transfer payments among countries are allowed. When transfer payments are possible, bilateral FTAs always achieve global free trade, but the ex-ante and ex-post inequalities of social welfare among countries are larger than those when all countries are independent because of the strategic bargaining behavior.
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页码:536 / 548
页数:13
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