Game theory and the study of American political development

被引:5
|
作者
Gailmard, Sean [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
Game theory; American political development; Political economy; EQUILIBRIUM; FOUNDATIONS; RATIONALITY; DEMOCRACY; CULTURE; RULE;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-019-00705-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Game theoretic analyses of American institutions and American political development largely are disconnected enterprises, yet they share many points of contact and thus opportunities for fruitful exchange. In this essay I discuss the value and limits of formalization for the enterprise of institutional analysis that those fields have in common. I conceptualize two broad approaches that formal modelers have taken to study institutions-institutions as game forms, and institutions as equilibria-that have been relatively successful for understanding institutionalchoiceandstability. At the same time, formal modelers have been less successful in addressing institutionalchangeanddevelopment, topics about which APD has much to offer. Overall, I contend that crosstalk between the two fields can benefit them both.
引用
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页码:335 / 357
页数:23
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