The economics of club bidding and value creation

被引：12
|
作者：
Marquez, Robert [1 ]
Singh, Rajdeep [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[2] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 108卷 / 02期
关键词：
Club bidding; Joint bidding; Mergers and acquisitions; Takeover auctions; Private equity; MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS; COLLUSION; PERFORMANCE; AUCTIONS; PRICE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.12.001
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Many acquisitions are conducted by clubs, i.e., coalitions of acquirers that submit a single bid. We present a novel analysis of club bidding where the club creates value by aggregating, at least partially, bidders' values. We show that club formation can lead to higher acquisition prices when the number of bidders is exogenously fixed and large. However, when entry costs require bidders to optimize their participation decisions, club formation acts as an endogenous limit on competition and reduces the target's premium. In contrast, social efficiency with club bidding is always higher. Our findings can reconcile the contradictory evidence on club bidding. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：493 / 505
页数：13
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