Funding natural monopoly infrastructure expansion: auctions versus regulated uniform access prices

被引：1

作者：

Khezr, Peyman ^{[1
]}

Menezes, Flavio M. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Queensland, Sch Econ, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia

来源：

JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 55卷 / 02期

关键词：

Auctions; Bidding; Infrastructure expansion; Access; Pricing; DISCRETE PUBLIC GOOD; PRIVATE PROVISION; EQUILIBRIA;

D O I：

10.1007/s11149-019-09382-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper characterizes equilibrium behavior in an auction where firms bid a unit price in order to fund and gain access to a new piece of infrastructure. Firms need access to this new infrastructure to sell their output in a competitive market. The new facility is built only if enough revenue is generated through the sale of access to the firms. We show by means of an example that this auction mechanism can dominate in terms of efficiency the standard mechanism where a uniform access price is determined ex-ante by a regulator.

引用

页码：193 / 213

页数：21