Tripartite Game Model of Agricultural Product Supply Chain Based on Evolutionary Game

In the green agricultural supply chain, the farmers who are at the top of the supply chain receive low income, and consumers who are at the end of the supply chain pay agricultural products with high prices for the lengthy intermediate links. In view of this phenomenon, this paper assumes that farmers provide the green agricultural products to consumers directly. We define a new parameter: brand grade coefficient and conduct the dynamic analysis of the evolution of the game between the farmers, the government and the consumers. We assign the parameters and then analyze the dynamic graph of evolutionary game under different initial strategies drawn with MATIAB. Finally, we conclude the final evolution trend of the three-dimensional evolutionary game. That is, the role of the government in the market slowly fades finally and the stability of the market mainly relies on the participation of consumers in the market and the game between consumers and farmers. The results indicate that consumers who take the initiative to participate in the market have a certain degree of substitution to supervision of the role of government regulators. Strengthening the consumer to participate in the market is conducive to maintaining market stability.