Convergence and Quality of Iterative Voting Under Non-Scoring Rules

被引：0
|
作者：
Koolyk, Aaron [1 ]
Lev, Omer [2 ]
Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
来源：
AAMAS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS | 2016年
基金：
以色列科学基金会;
关键词：
Social Choice; Equilibrium; Iterative Voting;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.
引用
收藏
页码：1329 / 1330
页数：2
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