Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

被引:25
|
作者
Ballesteros-Perez, Pablo [1 ]
Skitmore, Martin [2 ]
Pellicer, Eugenio [3 ]
Gutierrez-Bahamondes, Jimmy H. [4 ]
机构
[1] Sch Construct Management & Engn, Reading RG6 6AW, Berks, England
[2] QLD Univ Technol, Sch Civil Engn & Built Environm, Room S711, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia
[3] Univ Politecn Valencia, Sch Civil Engn, E-46022 Valencia, Spain
[4] Univ Talca, Fac Ingn, Curico, Chile
关键词
Bidding; Bidder identity; Auction; Tendering; Construction; Competitiveness; BIDDING STRATEGY; NUMBER; EBAY; BIDS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.11.001
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders' bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder's probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:158 / 172
页数:15
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