The political origin of pension funding

被引:21
|
作者
Perotti, Enrico [1 ]
Schwienbacher, Armin [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, Louvain, Belgium
关键词
POSITIVE THEORY; ECONOMY; DATABASE; RULES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfi.2008.11.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The paper seeks to explain the huge cross country variation in private pension funding, shaped by historical choice made when universal pension systems were created after the Great Depression. According to Perotti and von Thadden [Perotti, E., von Thadden, EA, 2006. The political economy of corporate control and labor rents. J. Polit. Econ., 145-175], large inflationary shocks due to war damage devastated middle class savings in some countries in the first half of the XX century. This shaped political preferences over the role of capital markets and social insurance, and contributed to the Great Reversals documented by Rajan and Zingales [Rajan, R-G., Zingales, L., 2003. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the 20th century. J. Finan. Econ. 69 (1), 5-50]. Wealth distribution shocks are indeed strongly related to private pension funding, as a large shock reduces the stock of private retirement assets by 58% of GDR While the sample size is limited, the results are robust to other explanations, such as legal origin, original financial development, past and current demographics, religion, electoral voting rules, redistributive politics, national experiences with financial market performance, or other major financial shocks that were not specifically redistributive. Corroborating evidence indicates that such redistributive shocks help explain the cross country variation in social expenditures, state ownership of industry, financial development and employment protection measures as predicted by the political shift hypothesis. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:384 / 404
页数:21
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