In this article, I focus on the factor of age as a determinant of individual support for the use of force by the government. I argue that socialization theory, as a key conceptual frame, should be supplemented by rational choice explanations for understanding individual preferences more fully. Employing survey data on the Chechen conflict, I investigate generational gaps in Russia regarding the government's use of force, and the form those gaps take. Empirically, I substantiate a theoretical claim that several generations exist in Russia, each with its own attitudes and beliefs, including the so-called "second edition of the Decembrists," "the people of the '60s," "the people of the '70s," "the generation of perestroika," "the disappointed generation," and a "lost generation/mega-consumers." I find strong, albeit surprising, evidence of a generational gap in Russia, with respondents born in different time periods, especially "the '60s people" and "mega-consumers" expressing variable attitudes toward the Chechnya conflict. Related Articles Brader, Ted A., and Joshua A. Tucker. 2009. "What's Left Behind When the Party's Over: Survey Experiments on the Effects of Partisan Cues in Putin's Russia." Politics & Policy 37 (4): 843-868. Smyth, Regina. 2014. "The Putin Factor: Personalism, Protest, and Regime Stability in Russia." Politics & Policy 42 (4): 567-592. Stegmaier, Mary A., and Gwyn Erb. 2008. "Gender and Generation Gaps in Russian Economic Values during the Yeltsin Years." Politics & Policy 33 (3): 416-443.