Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments

被引:0
|
作者
Kartik, Navin [1 ]
Lee, SangMok [2 ]
Rappoport, Daniel [3 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Washington Univ St Louis, St Louis, MO USA
[3] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL USA
来源
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2023年 / 91卷 / 05期
关键词
Monotone comparative statics; Choice among lotteries; Interval equilibria; Aggregating single crossing; LOTTERIES; IMPLEMENTATION; STRATEGY; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1093/restud/rdad103
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An agent's preferences depend on an ordered parameter or type. We characterize the set of utility functions with single-crossing differences (SCD) in convex environments. These include preferences over lotteries, both in expected utility and rank-dependent utility frameworks, and preferences over bundles of goods and over consumption streams. Our notion of SCD does not presume an order on the choice space. This unordered SCD is necessary and sufficient for "interval choice" comparative statics. We present applications to cheap talk, observational learning, and collective choice, showing how convex environments arise in these problems and how SCD/interval choice are useful. Methodologically, our main characterization stems from a result on linear aggregations of single-crossing functions.
引用
收藏
页码:2981 / 3012
页数:32
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