Credible School Value-Added with Undersubscribed School Lotteries

被引:2
|
作者
Angrist, Joshua [1 ,2 ]
Hull, Peter [2 ,3 ]
Pathak, Parag A. [1 ,2 ]
Walters, Christopher [2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Brown Univ, Providence, RI USA
[4] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
IMPACTS; COLLEGE; DESIGN; MODELS; CHOICE; TESTS;
D O I
10.1162/rest_a_01149
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We introduce two empirical strategies harnessing the randomness in school assignment mechanisms to measure school value-added. The first estimator controls for the probability of school assignment, treating take-up as ignorable. We test this assumption using randomness in assignments. The second approach uses assignments as instrumental variables (IVs) for low-dimensional models of value-added and forms empirical Bayes posteriors from these IV estimates. Both strategies solve the underidentification challenge arising from school undersubscription. Models controlling for assignment risk and lagged achievement in Denver and New York City yield reliable value-added estimates. Estimates from models with lower-quality achievement controls are improved by IV.
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页码:1 / 19
页数:19
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