Multidimensional Premarital Investments with Imperfect Commitment

被引:0
|
作者
Bhaskar, V. [1 ]
Li, Wenchao [2 ]
Yi, Junjian [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[2] Tongji Univ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Peking Univ, Beijing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM; MARRIAGE;
D O I
10.1086/724574
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g., men in China), since parents of boys will increase housing investments in order to credibly commit to share more resources with the boy's potential wife, possibly crowding out human capital investments.
引用
收藏
页码:2893 / 2919
页数:27
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