Open Data in the Digital Economy: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

被引:4
|
作者
Li, Qin [1 ]
Pi, Bin [2 ]
Feng, Minyu [3 ]
Kurths, Juergen [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Chongqing Univ, Sch Publ Policy & Adm, Chongqing 400044, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Sch Math Sci, Chengdu 611731, Peoples R China
[3] Southwest Univ, Coll Artificial Intelligence, Chongqing 400715, Peoples R China
[4] Potsdam Inst Climate Impact Res, D-14437 Potsdam, Germany
[5] Humboldt Univ, Inst Phys, D-12489 Berlin, Germany
关键词
Data quality; evolutionary game theory (EGT); evolutionary stable strategy (ESS); open data;
D O I
10.1109/TCSS.2023.3324087
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Open data, as an essential element in the sustainable development of the digital economy, is highly valued by many relevant sectors in the implementation process. However, most studies suppose that there are only data providers and users in the open data process and ignore the existence of data regulators. In order to establish long-term green supply relationships between multistakeholders, we hereby introduce data regulators and propose an evolutionary game model to observe the cooperation tendency of multistakeholders (data providers, users, and regulators). The newly proposed game model enables us to intensively study the trading behavior which can be realized as strategies and payoff functions of the data providers, users, and regulators. Besides, a replicator dynamic system is built to study evolutionary stable strategies of multistakeholders. In simulations, we investigate the evolution of the cooperation ratio as time progresses under different parameters, which is proved to be in agreement with our theoretical analysis. Furthermore, we explore the influence of the cost of data users to acquire data, the value of open data, the reward (penalty) from the regulators, and the data mining capability of data users to group strategies and uncover some regular patterns. Some meaningful results are also obtained through simulations, which can guide stakeholders to make better decisions in the future.
引用
收藏
页码:3780 / 3791
页数:12
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Evolutionary game theory: lessons and limitations, a cancer perspective
    J W McEvoy
    [J]. British Journal of Cancer, 2009, 101 : 2060 - 2061
  • [2] Information Acquisition Behavior: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective
    Jialu Li
    Meiying Yang
    Wei Xing
    Xuan Zhao
    [J]. Dynamic Games and Applications, 2018, 8 : 434 - 455
  • [3] Information Acquisition Behavior: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective
    Li, Jialu
    Yang, Meiying
    Xing, Wei
    Zhao, Xuan
    [J]. DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS, 2018, 8 (02) : 434 - 455
  • [4] Evidence Combination From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective
    Deng, Xinyang
    Han, Deqiang
    Dezert, Jean
    Deng, Yong
    Shyr, Yu
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS, 2016, 46 (09) : 2070 - 2082
  • [5] Evolutionary game theory: lessons and limitations, a cancer perspective
    McEvoy, J. W.
    [J]. BRITISH JOURNAL OF CANCER, 2009, 101 (12) : 2060 - 2061
  • [6] The ecology of cancer from an evolutionary game theory perspective
    Pacheco, Jorge M.
    Santos, Francisco C.
    Dingli, David
    [J]. INTERFACE FOCUS, 2014, 4 (04)
  • [7] A Digital Game to Learn About Open Data
    Di Staso, Davide
    Kleiman, Fernando
    Crompvoets, Joep
    Janssen, Marijn
    [J]. ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT, EGOV 2021, 2021, 12850 : 153 - 164
  • [8] Evolutionary game of platform enterprises, government and consumers in the context of digital economy
    Li, Cui
    Li, Hong
    Tao, Changqi
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, 2023, 167
  • [9] Reply: Evolutionary game theory: lessons and limitations, a cancer perspective
    D Dingli
    F A C C Chalub
    F C Santos
    S Van Segbroeck
    J M Pacheco
    [J]. British Journal of Cancer, 2009, 101 : 2062 - 2063
  • [10] Evolutionary game theory of continuous traits from a causal perspective
    Lehtonen, Jussi
    Otsuka, Jun
    [J]. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 2023, 378 (1876)