Market Liquidity and Competition Among Designated Market Makers

被引：1
|
作者：
Bellia, Mario [1 ]
Pelizzon, Loriana [2 ,3 ]
Subrahmanyam, Marti G. [4 ,5 ]
Yuferova, Darya [6 ,7 ]
机构：
[1] Joint Res Ctr JRC, European Commiss, I-21020 Ispra, Italy
[2] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, SAFE, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany
[3] CaFoscari Univ Venice, I-30123 Venice, Italy
[4] CEPR, London EC1V 0DX, England
[5] NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA
[6] NYU Shanghai, Shanghai 200122, Peoples R China
[7] Norwegian Sch Econ NHH, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
来源：
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2024年
关键词：
designated market makers; DMMs; liquidity provision; EFFICIENCY;
D O I：
10.1287/mnsc.2022.01801
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
Do competition and incentives offered to designated market makers (DMMs) improve market liquidity? We employ data from NYSE Euronext Paris to show that exogenous changes in contract design lead to significant decreases in quoted and effective spreads. In particular, market liquidity increases the most for stocks with the largest increase in competition among DMMs. Our analysis shows that competition among DMMs is an important aspect of contract design, along with elements such as rebates and requirements.
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页数：19
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