Biometrics and the metaphysics of personal identity

被引:1
|
作者
Kind, Amy [1 ]
机构
[1] Claremont McKenna Coll, Dept Philosophy, 850 Columbia Ave, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
关键词
person re-identification; philosophical aspects; TRACKING;
D O I
10.1049/bme2.12062
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
The vast advances in biometrics over the past several decades have brought with them a host of pressing concerns. Philosophical scrutiny has already been devoted to many of the relevant ethical and political issues, especially ones arising from matters of privacy, bias, and security in data collection. But philosophers have devoted surprisingly little attention to the relevant metaphysical issues, in particular, ones concerning matters of personal identity. This paper aims to take some initial steps to correct this oversight. After discussing the philosophical problem of personal identity, the ways in which the notion of biometric identity connects with, or fails to connect with, the philosophical notion of personal identity is explored. Though there may be some good reasons to use biometric identity to track personal identity, it is contended that biometric identity is not the same thing as personal identity and thus that biometrics researchers should stop talking as if it were.
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页码:176 / 182
页数:7
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