To Bid or Not to Bid? That is the Question! First- Versus Second-Mover Advantage in Negotiations

被引:0
|
作者
Maaravi, Yossi [1 ]
Levy, Aharon [2 ]
Heller, Ben [3 ]
机构
[1] Reichman Univ IDC, Adelson Sch Entrepreneurship, Herzliyya, Israel
[2] McKinsey & Co Inc, Chicago, IL USA
[3] Reichman Univ, Baruch Ivcher Sch Psychol, DICE Judgment & Decis Making Lab, Herzliyya, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
negotiation; information; first offer; power; second offer; strategy; MOVING; 1ST; POWER; OFFERS; ANCHORS; CULTURE; DISADVANTAGE; ALTERNATIVES; UNCERTAINTY; PERSPECTIVE; ROBUSTNESS;
D O I
10.1111/nejo.12438
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
For the past two decades, negotiation research has established a first-mover advantage based on the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Negotiation scholars have argued that first offers serve as anchors that affect both counteroffers and settlement prices. Consequently, management education-including negotiation articles, books, courses, and seminars-often recommends that negotiators move first to "anchor" their counterparts. Nonetheless, a growing body of recent research contradicts this general advice and points to a second-mover advantage in specific cases. Interestingly, this contradiction was termed the "practitioner-researcher paradox," as practitioners and negotiation experts appeared to understand the benefits of moving second in negotiations, which scholars-up until recently-generally have overlooked. The current article offers a solution to this paradox by proposing three key factors that might explain the conditions and circumstances of first- versus second-mover advantage in negotiations. These three factors are central in negotiation research and practice: information, power, and strategy. Given the centrality of first offers in negotiations, the solution to this paradox is crucial for negotiation scholars, businesspeople, managers, and anyone else who finds themselves in a negotiation.
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 278
页数:20
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