Proportionality in the European Banking Law.Lessons from Silicon Valley Bank

被引:0
|
作者
Arrigoni, Matteo [1 ]
Restelli, Enrico Rino [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cattolica Sacro Cuore, Corp Law, Milan, Italy
[2] Univ Milano Bicocca, Milan, Italy
关键词
GOVERNANCE;
D O I
10.1515/ecfr-2023-0031
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
European prudential regulation imposes significant compliance costs on banks, justifying extensive use of proportionality. However, the failure of Silicon Valley Bank raised numerous objections to this approach. According to many scholars and practitioners, the crisis of SBV originated from a substantial loosening of the regulatory standards and the corresponding supervisory enforcement. In this context, the article discusses the intricate relations between proportionality and financial stability, reaching an articulated conclusion. While concerning prudential capital requirements it seems reasonable to adopt a uniform discipline, as to supervision (e. g., SREP), a proportional approach seems more appropriate. At the same time, the failure of SVB advocates in favor of a partly different approach toward corporate governance.
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页码:936 / 963
页数:28
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