Tarski's Theory of the Formal Correctness of Definitions

In his 1933 monograph on the concept of truth, Alfred Tarski claimed that his definition of truth satisfied "the usual conditions of methodological correctness", which in a 1935 article he identified as consistency and back-translatability. Following the rules of defining for an axiomatized theory was supposed to ensure satisfaction of the two conditions. But Tarski neither explained the two conditions nor supplied rules of defining for any axiomatized theory. We can make explicit what Tarski understood by consistency and back-translatability, with the help of (1) an account by Ajdukiewicz (1936) of the criteria underlying the practice of articulating rules of defining for axiomatized theories and (2) a critique by Frege (1903) of definitions that conjure an object into existence as that which satisfies a specified condition without first proving that exactly one object does so. I show that satisfaction of the conditions of consistency and back-translatability as thus explained is guaranteed by the rules of defining articulated by Lesniewski (1931) for an axiomatized system of propositional logic. I then construct analogous rules of defining for the theory within which Tarski developed his definition of truth. Tarski's 32 definitions in this theory occasionally violate these rules, but the violations are easily repaired. I argue that the Lesniewski-Ajdukiewicz theory of formal correctness of definitions within which Tarski worked is superior in some respects to the widely accepted analogous theory articulated by Suppes (1957).