ESG and CEO turnover around the world

被引:4
|
作者
Colak, Gonul [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Korkeamaki, Timo P. [4 ]
Meyer, Niclas Oskar [1 ]
机构
[1] Hanken Sch Econ, Arkadiankatu 22, Helsinki 00101, Finland
[2] Univ Sussex, Business Sch, Sussex House, Brighton BN1 9RH, England
[3] Prague Univ Econ & Business, Fac Finance & Accounting, Prague, Czech Republic
[4] Aalto Univ, Sch Business, Ekonominaukio 1, Aalto 00076, Finland
基金
芬兰科学院;
关键词
ESG risk; CEO turnover; Shareholder value maximization; Pecuniary costs; Non-pecuniary considerations; REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; REPUTATIONAL PENALTY; INVESTOR PROTECTION; EXECUTIVE TURNOVER; EXTERNALITIES; CONSEQUENCES; LITIGATION; INFERENCE; DIRECTORS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102523
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate whether CEOs around the world are held accountable for stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases significantly when the media coverage of the ESG incidents reaches extreme levels. CEO turnovers occur even in the cases where an incident does not lead to a stock price decline. In such cases, the board likely has a nonpecuniary motive for the turnover. This suggests that such non-pecuniary reputational concerns are an important determinant of CEO turnover decisions around the world, especially when the firm is facing intense public pressure due to stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. This effect is more pronounced when firms are headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries like many European countries.
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页数:30
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