Aid coordination through competition? Unintended consequences of China-Japan rivalry in foreign aid policy in Asia

被引:1
|
作者
Hoshiro, Hiroyuki [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tokyo, Inst Social Sci, Tokyo, Japan
关键词
aid coordination; China and Japan; economic infrastructure; the Paris Declaration; INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT; DONOR COORDINATION; ALLOCATION;
D O I
10.1093/irap/lcad016
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
The power struggle between China and Japan in Asia continues, with their political confrontations extending to foreign aid rivalry. While Japan used to dominate in foreign aid in the region, China has overtaken it with its infrastructure assistance. No formal regional aid and development framework has yet been developed here. However, this article argues that unintentional donor coordination between China and Japan has been realized. The aid provided by the two does not overlap as each country tends to focus on a limited number of recipients, and a natural division of labor originates. Why has their rivalry resulted in aid coordination? This article answers the question by examining the behaviors of Japanese and Chinese aid and finding that, ironically, it is their shared interest in economic infrastructure aid that creates such a situation.
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页数:36
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