PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION: EMBODIMENT, LANGUAGE, SUBJECTIVITY

被引:0
|
作者
Artemenko, Natalia [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] St Petersburg State Univ, Inst Philosophy, St Petersburg 199034, Russia
[2] Immanuel Kant Baltic Fed Univ, Kaliningrad 236016, Russia
来源
关键词
productive imagination; Kant; function of time; temporal syntheses; knowledge; subjective deduction; pro-creative function;
D O I
10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-1-216-234
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The aim of our "discussion remark" is not to present a critical review on the book written by S. Geniusas, a brilliant study notable by its extreme painstakingness, historical sensitivity and terminological accuracy, but rather to delve deeply into the origins of phenomenological understanding of productive imagination, i.e., to turn "back to Kant", given in Saulius Geniusas' book (the first chapter) for introductory reason. We proceed from S. Geniusas remark that productive imagination establishes a relation between different abilities, reconciles the antagonism between them and, in this respect, exercises a pro-creative function. We reveal that it is this pro-creative element of productive imagination that brings it closer to time (as indicated by Viktor Molchanov, a prominent Russian phenomenologist, inhis study of 1988) and serves as the basis for gaining new knowledge. Imagination acts as a limit for reflection, however, it gets revealed only through reflecting, and, thus, it proves to be connected with a fundamental layer of consciousness, which appears both as an object and as a means of describing reflection, i.e., as time. The convergence, or rather, identification, of time with imagination lies in the very fact that both of them exercise an objective function: time - as a possibility for semantic definition of objectivity, imagination - as a basis for a possibility of any knowledge. Moreover, imagination turns out to be a source of a paradox and, ultimately, the only thing that explains self-cognition.
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页码:216 / 234
页数:19
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