Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves

被引:0
|
作者
Dur, Umut [1 ]
Zhang, Yanning [1 ]
机构
[1] North Carolina State Univ, Dept Econ, Raleigh, NC 27695 USA
关键词
Market design; Matching; Affirmative action; Diversity; SCHOOL CHOICE; CONSTRAINTS; STABILITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102907
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the allocation of homogeneous positions under affirmative action policies where some positions are reserved for underrepresented groups on a "minimum guarantee"basis. Each individual has a merit-based score and may be eligible for multiple reserves. When an individual counts towards each of the reserves that she is eligible for upon admission, we propose a choice function that satisfies three properties: the minimum guarantee requirement, non-wastefulness, and a stronger fairness notion than the one introduced by Sonmez and Yenmez (2019). Our proposed choice function is the unique one that produces an assignment achieving the maximal cutoff score in a recursive way among all non-wasteful assignments satisfying the minimum guarantee requirement. We show that the outcome of this choice function is not score-wise dominated by any other assignment that satisfies the minimum guarantee requirement.
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页数:7
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