Coordination contracts and numerical analysis of low-carbon competitive supply chains under the influence of low-carbon goodwill

被引:0
|
作者
Xie, De-ru [1 ]
Qin, Qin [1 ]
Xie, Jian-min [1 ,2 ]
He, Xin-jing [1 ]
Jiang, Mao-ting [1 ]
机构
[1] Southwest Univ Sci & Technol SWUST, Sch Econ & Management, Mianyang, Peoples R China
[2] Southwest Univ Sci & Technol SWUST, Sichuan Tianfu New Area Innovat Res Inst, Chengdu, Peoples R China
关键词
green manufacturers; low-carbon goodwill; low-carbon advertising competition; contractual option; differential game; STRATEGIES; SUPPORT;
D O I
10.3389/fenvs.2023.1260667
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Introduction: Under the dual opportunities of low-carbon consumption preference and online consumption platforms, vendors' low-carbon advertising incursions provide opportunities for decarbonization and market position enhancement, as well as further research on the value of low-carbon advertising. This study aims to explore the contractual choices of green vendors' online channels participating in low-carbon advertising competition under the low-carbon goodwill effect, and to simulate and evaluate the contractual choices of supply chain members.Methods: Using differential games, through the innovative application of the traditional low-carbon goodwill model and the introduction of the low-carbon advertising competition intensity coefficient, we design one-way and two-way cost-sharing contracts under low-carbon competition, coordinate the vicious competition in the supply chain, and provide contractual choices for supply chain participants.Results and discussion: Under the low-carbon advertising competition decision, the manufacturer has an absolute low-carbon market advantage, but the interests of all supply chain members are weakened, and interestingly, the manufacturer, who dominates the market, is the facilitator of the contractual agreement. Second, well-designed pacts can provide manufacturers and traders with more options for low-carbon strategies. Although both one-way and two-way cost-sharing pacts can generate Pareto gains for the supply chain and its members in advertising competition, two-way cost-sharing pacts are superior to one-way pacts in terms of coordination advantages. In addition, an important finding is that greater profit growth can be achieved through contractual cooperation in low-intensity advertising competition. Thus, moderate competition is desirable, while excessive competition can harm the supply chain system. Manufacturers should actively urge retailers to cooperate in order to optimize profits and establish long-term stable partnerships between upstream and downstream firms in green supply chains.
引用
收藏
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers' Low-Carbon Preference
    Wu, Dan
    Yang, Yuxiang
    [J]. SUSTAINABILITY, 2020, 12 (09)
  • [2] Coordination contracts for a supply chain with yield uncertainty and low-carbon preference
    Peng, Hongjun
    Pang, Tao
    Cong, Jing
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2018, 205 : 291 - 302
  • [3] Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill
    Zhang, Ziyuan
    Yu, Liying
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2021, 18 (02) : 1 - 33
  • [4] Competitive Decision Policies in Supply Chains Considering Investment of Low-Carbon Technology
    Zhao, Ruidong
    Huang, Huafei
    Li, Bo
    [J]. MODERN INDUSTRIAL IOT, BIG DATA AND SUPPLY CHAIN, IIOTBDSC 2020, 2021, 218 : 263 - 270
  • [5] Decisions and coordination in low-carbon supply chains with a wholesale price constraint under government subsidies
    Ren, Fuxia
    Hu, Benyong
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2024, 277
  • [6] Protect global supply chains for low-carbon technologies
    Goldthau, Andreas
    Hughes, Llewelyn
    [J]. NATURE, 2020, 585 (7823) : 28 - 30
  • [7] Protect global supply chains for low-carbon technologies
    Andreas Goldthau
    Llewelyn Hughes
    [J]. Nature, 2020, 585 : 28 - 30
  • [8] Optimal pricing and complex analysis for low-carbon apparel supply chains
    Ma, Junhai
    Wang, Zongxian
    [J]. APPLIED MATHEMATICAL MODELLING, 2022, 111 : 610 - 629
  • [9] Revenue sharing contract of low-carbon service supply chain under carbon trading and consumers' low-carbon preference
    Liu, Zhen
    Song, Han
    Dai, Ying
    Peng, Wei
    [J]. Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS, 2022, 28 (01): : 294 - 306
  • [10] Low-carbon precincts for low-carbon living
    Newton, Peter W.
    [J]. CARBON MANAGEMENT, 2014, 5 (01) : 5 - 8