Anti-corruption Campaigns and Pay-performance Sensitivity: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

被引:1
|
作者
Cheng, Maoyong [1 ]
Meng, Yu [1 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Econ & Finance, 74 Yanta West Rd, Xian 710061, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
关键词
Anti-corruption campaign; pay-performance sensitivity; CEOs' compensation; China; RESTRUCTURING CHARGES; CORPORATE PERFORMANCE; CEO COMPENSATION; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2022.2088350
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore whether anti-corruption campaigns affect pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) in Chinese listed companies. Using a detailed anti-corruption data set at the city level from 2012 to 2018, we find that anti-corruption campaigns lead CEOs to shield (justify) their compensation by increasing pay-performance sensitivity. This result passes a series of robustness tests and endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, channel tests show that anti-corruption campaigns increase pay-performance sensitivity via the deterrence effect and the contagion effect. Cross-sectional tests show that the positive relationship between anti-corruption campaigns and PPS is more pronounced in larger firms and firms that belong to oligopoly markets.
引用
收藏
页码:192 / 217
页数:26
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