On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets

被引：1
|
作者：
de Pinto, Marco [1 ]
Goerke, Laszlo [2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
Palermo, Alberto [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Appl Labour Studies, Seckenheimer Landstr 16, D-68163 Mannheim, Germany
[2] IAAEU, Behringstr 21, D-54296 Trier, Germany
[3] Trier Univ, Behringstr 21, D-54296 Trier, Germany
[4] IZA Bonn, Behringstr 21, D-54296 Trier, Germany
[5] CESifo Munchen, Behringstr 21, D-54296 Trier, Germany
[6] GLO, Behringstr 21, D-54296 Trier, Germany
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2023年 / 138卷
关键词：
Adverse selection; Oligopoly; Welfare; FREE ENTRY; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; CONTRACTS; BARRIERS; PRIVATE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.012
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. Principals pay infor-mational rents due to asymmetric information and sell their output in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly. We find that asymmetric information may mitigate or more than com-pensate the welfare reducing impact of market power, irrespective of whether the number of firms is given exogenously or determined endogenously by a profit constraint. We further show that welfare in a setting with adverse selection may be higher than the maximized welfare level attainable in a world with perfect observability.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：22 / 41
页数：20
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