Ronald Dworkin: Seeking Truth and Justice through Responsibility

被引:0
|
作者
Ibric, Samra [1 ]
机构
[1] ZHAW Sch Management & Law, Ctr Regulat & Competit, Gertrudstr 15, CH-8401 Winterthur, Switzerland
关键词
truth; responsibility; moral objectivity; interpretation; values; legal reasoning; Ronald Dworkin;
D O I
10.3390/laws12030041
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
According to Dworkin, "truth" is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with the analysis of the underlying values we attach to these concepts. Dworkin understands the true as a matter of interpretation, which-and this is often misunderstood-is capable of producing a correct conception of the truth. The truth is thereby directly related to justice. Dworkin even ties his theory of interpretation to an objective truth that can only produce conclusive reasons for a specific advocacy of a particular position in an argument after responsible and intensive debate-in the sense of his two-stage theory. In fact, it turns out that Dworkin's search for and conception of an objective truth describes a (historical) process. We interpret what our ancestors have already interpreted and continue to understand (in a modified way). This reflexive responsibility is ours to bear; according to Dworkin, it is our responsibility to always stand up for truth through good arguments.
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页数:9
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