Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with interactive diversity

In real society, individuals may treat their neighbors differently and independently make investment decisions among different projects. In this study, the selective cooperator, who only invests in the cooperative organizers as part of the cooperation strategy is introduced to investigate the impact of interactive diversity on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game from two different investment modes, namely fixed cost per player (FCP) and fixed cost per game (FCG). The fraction of selective coop-erators among cooperators is represented by an adjustable parameter & alpha;. The simulation results show that a higher value of & alpha; is more beneficial for the survival of cooperators. Particularly, because of the existence of both the inter-individual heterogeneity and intra-individual heterogeneity in FCG mode, the positive role of selective cooperators in FCG is more significant than in FCP mode. When selective cooperators are introduced as the third strategy, we observe that the traditional cooperators always die out first, and the stable state only depends on the interaction between the defectors and selective cooperators, same as & alpha; = 1 when there are only two strategies. Our findings reveal that only focusing on the neighbor's strategy can promote the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behaviors. We hope this work can provide a deeper understanding on how cooperation emerges. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.