A model of endogenous targeting in duopoly

被引：0
|
作者：
Siemering, Christian [1 ]
机构：
[1] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Inst Microecon, Sch Econ & Management, Konigsworther Pl 1, D-30167 Hannover, Germany
来源：
INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY | 2023年 / 64卷
关键词：
Targeted advertising; Technology investments; Excessive targeting; Welfare; SEGMENTATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101047
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The paper investigates welfare effects of targeted advertising in a duopoly. To this end, a game-theoretical model is proposed in which firms can make costly investments in their targeting technology. It can be shown that ex ante identical firms use different technologies in every pure-strategy equilibrium of the technology game. If firms target the same group of consumers, the low-technology firm could increase overall welfare by using a better technology. However, this leads to lower industry profits due to tougher competition among firms.
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页数：10
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