A model of police financing through income and consumption taxes

被引:0
|
作者
Deng, Weiguang [1 ]
Li, Xue [1 ]
Luo, Zijun [2 ]
机构
[1] Hunan Univ, Sch Econ & Trade, 109 Shijiachong Rd, Changsha, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Nebraska, Coll Business Adm, Dept Econ, Omaha, NE 68182 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
consumption tax; income tax; police financing; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; DETERRENCE; CRIME; ENFORCEMENT; PUNISHMENT;
D O I
10.1111/sjpe.12337
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article studies police financing with a focus on the difference in the timing between federal and local government funds. In general, federal government funds came from income taxes collected before possible appropriative activities while local government funds came from consumption taxes collected afterwards. We find that income-tax financing results in more workers, more police, and fewer thieves when appropriation and tax rates are the same between the two cases. Funding the police before possible appropriative activities works as a deterrence. Our findings show the complexity of studying crime and police financing even in a highly stylized model.
引用
收藏
页码:217 / 230
页数:14
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