A Cascading Failure Model of the Air Traffic Control Network Based on the Theory of Interdependent Networks

With the continuous development of information technology, a spontaneous interdependent network has formed within the air traffic control network. Due to the internal interdependence, any small, failed node may trigger a cascade failure of the entire system. The purpose of this study is to investigate the resilience of air traffic control networks. Based on air traffic management regulations, a new cascading failure model for air traffic control networks is proposed, which is based on the theory of interdependent networks. The model establishes a dual-layer dependency relationship between the control coordination network and the air route facility network, including control dependency and service dependency. Through experiments, targeted measures are proposed to improve the safety and reliability of air traffic control. This model introduces parameters such as control cost and node control capability, and reflects the resilience of the air traffic control network, based on the final number of failed nodes after the steady-state of the cascade failure, the network's cascade failure rate, and the system's load failure threshold. Simulation results show that enhancing the control capability and increasing the number of control positions can improve the control cost of the air traffic control network. The higher the control cost, the better the resilience of the air traffic control network. Improving the control capability of control nodes has a greater impact on the resilience of the air traffic control network, compared to increasing the number of control nodes. The degree attack on route nodes has a greater impact on the cascade failure of the air traffic control network, compared to random attacks and facility node degree attacks. The cascade failure model proposed in this paper provides a new method for guiding the air traffic control network to resist cascade failure attacks and enhance its resilience.