Who will pay for the ?bicycle cemetery?? Evolutionary game analysis of recycling abandoned shared bicycles under dynamic reward and punishment

被引:33
|
作者
Sun, Qingqing [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Hong [2 ,3 ]
Long, Ruyin [2 ,4 ]
Yang, Jiahui [1 ]
机构
[1] China Univ Min & Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Xuzhou 221116, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Jiangnan Univ, Sch Business, Wuxi 214122, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[3] Jiangnan Univ, Res Inst Natl Secur & Green Dev, 1800 Lihu Ave, Wuxi 214122, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[4] Jiangnan Univ, Inst Jiangnan Culture, Wuxi 214122, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
关键词
OR in societal problem analysis; Evolutionary game; Shared bicycles; Dynamic rewards and punishments; Waste recycling; EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY; SHARING ECONOMY; BIKE; INTENTIONS; STRATEGIES; MANAGEMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2022.06.013
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
China is the largest market for shared bicycles, and its "bicycle cemetery" phenomenon has attracted widespread attention. The end treatment of abandoned bicycles has become a key issue in the promo-tion of green travel and sustainable transportation. This paper introduces extended producer responsibil-ity (EPR) and green tax, two WEEE recycling methods in the recycling system for abandoned bicycles in China, and builds a two-party game model based on local government supervision and corporate recy-cling strategies. The results show that setting a minimum recycling standard of 0.65 and implementing a strategy of rewards as the primary factor and punishment as a supplement helps enterprises to choose the more environmentally friendly EPR approach. The conversion rate and the level of enterprise effort positively affect the adoption of EPR by enterprises and can speed up the evolution of local governments to equilibrium strategies. What's more interesting is that controlling the government's regulatory invest-ment to prevent enterprises from "free-riding" helps to promote the coordinated recycling of abandoned bicycles. This research is based on the current situation in China and offers a new perspective on recy-cling abandoned bicycles. The conclusions provide a reference for other countries seeking to formulate effective policies for the management of abandoned bicycles.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:917 / 929
页数:13
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