The Trust Signaling Hypothesis of Humility: How Humble Leaders Elicit Greater Monetary Contributions

We advance prior work on humility by proposing the trust signaling hypothesis of humility. Five preregistered experiments (N = 3,302), examined whether humble leaders humility would elicit more favorable ratings, greater trust, and generate behavioral intentions toward making financial contributions. Experiment 1 (n = 864) revealed that humble leaders elicited more favorable ratings and intentions to make financial contributions, even when leader competence was low. These interactive effects were mediated by perceived trustworthiness. Experiment 2 (n = 807) replicated these effects and compared for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Experiment 3 (n = 823) clarified these effects and compared domestic and international organizations. Experiment 4 (n = 375), replicated these effects using a more direct leader description. Experiment 5 (n = 433) revealed a boundary condition, wherein likable leaders were viewed as or more favorably than humble leaders. We discuss the central role of trust and the financial appeal of humble leaders.