The Australian News Media Bargaining Code (NMBC) is the first successful legislative attempt to compel digital platforms to pay news media organisations for third party news content. This paper focuses on the NMBC after its first year to explore whether the Code was successful in meeting one of its publicly stated purposes; supporting public interest journalism. We argue that the Code delivered outcomes that met the ACCC's policy objectives around an industry power imbalance, but there are several issues that remain unaddressed. Using semi-structured interviews from Australian news media executives involved in negotiations with Meta and Google during the initial implementation of the Code, we explore: (a) how news organisations used financial compensation provided by agreements under the Code, (b) how individual organisational priorities were framed and articulated, and (c) whether these actions have supported public interest journalism in Australia. Our findings indicate that many of issues with the Code have emerged mostly from the unintended impacts of the Code, including: lack of designation of platforms within the legislation, the registration criteria for news outlets eligible to enter negotiation, and the definition of stakeholder relationships within the legislation. (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(NMBC)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)<SIC>(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)付(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)费(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)聚焦(sic)NMBC(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)?(sic)(sic)NMBC(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)<SIC>(sic)(sic)(sic):(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)?NMBC(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)符(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)费(sic)委(sic)(sic)(ACCC)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)衡(sic)(sic)(sic)<SIC>(sic)?(sic)仍(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)NMBC(sic)<SIC>(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)Meta(sic)Google(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)半(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)?(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic):a)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)NMBC(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)偿?b)<SIC>(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)<SIC>(sic)(sic)<SIC>(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)?c)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)?NMBC(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)NMBC(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)?(sic)(sic)(sic):(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)?(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)记(sic)(sic)?(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic). El Codigo de Negociacion de Medios de Noticias de Australia (NMBC) es el primer intento legislativo exitoso de obligar a las plataformas digitales a pagar a las organizaciones de medios de comunicacion por el contenido de noticias de terceros. Este documento se centra en el NMBC despues de su primer ano para explorar si el Codigo logro cumplir con uno de sus propositos declarados publicamente; apoyar el periodismo de interes publico. Argumentamos que el Codigo entrego resultados que cumplieron con los objetivos de la politica de la ACCC en torno a un desequilibrio de poder de la industria, pero hay varios problemas que siguen sin abordarse. Usando entrevistas semiestructuradas de ejecutivos de medios de comunicacion australianos involucrados en negociaciones con Meta y Google durante la implementacion inicial del Codigo, exploramos: a) como las organizaciones de noticias usaron la compensacion financiera proporcionada por los acuerdos bajo el Codigo, b) como las prioridades organizacionales individuales fueron enmarcado y articulado, y c) si estas acciones han apoyado el periodismo de interes publico en Australia. Nuestros hallazgos indican que muchos de los problemas con el Codigo surgieron principalmente de los impactos no deseados del Codigo, que incluyen: la falta de designacion de plataformas dentro de la legislacion, los criterios de registro para los medios de comunicacion elegibles para entrar en negociacion y la definicion de las relaciones de las partes interesadas dentro la legislacion.
