Market power in California's water market

被引:1
|
作者
Tomori, Franceska [1 ]
Ansink, Erik [2 ]
Houba, Harold [3 ]
Hagerty, Nick [4 ]
Bos, Charles [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rovira i Virgili, Dept Econ, ECO SOS, Reus, Spain
[2] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Tinbergen Inst, Dept Spatial Econ, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[3] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, Tinbergen Inst, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[4] Montana State Univ, Dept Agr Econ & Econ, Bozeman, MT USA
[5] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Finance, Tinbergen Inst, Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
California; market power; Nash-Cournot; water markets; GAINS; TRADE;
D O I
10.1111/ajae.12434
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.
引用
收藏
页码:1274 / 1299
页数:26
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