Asynchronous attack tolerant control for Markov jump cyber-physical systems under hybrid cyber-attacks

This article considers the problem of asynchronous attack tolerant control for a type of Markov jump cyber-physical systems (MJCPSs) suffering hybrid cyber-attacks. In the measurement channel, the Denial -of -Service (DoS) attack and deception attack are cogitated simultaneously. Meanwhile, the impact generated by the deficiency of plant mode information due to cyberattacks is described via the partial unknown mode transition probability and the asynchronization between the plant and the controller. On these bases, a detected -mode -dependent asynchronous dynamic controller with a certain capacity to resist malevolent cyber-attacks is proposed. Then, to guarantee the stochastic stability and reach the designated infinity performance for MJCPSs under hybrid cyber-attacks, sufficient conditions are given by means of some decoupling technologies. Finally, the effectiveness of the presented control tactic is demonstrated, which is supported by an application on a linearized F-404 engine system.