Research on the evolutionary game of safety behavior of EPC consortium members based on prospect theory

被引:1
|
作者
Chen, Zeyou [1 ]
Xia, Liang [1 ]
Su, Yangyang [1 ]
Chen, Guangran [2 ]
Zhang, Zheyuan [1 ]
机构
[1] Xihua Univ, Sch Architecture & Civil Engn, Chengdu, Peoples R China
[2] Natl Univ Malaysia, Sch Engn & Built Environm, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
关键词
EPC consortium; safety behavior; prospect theory; evolutionary game;
D O I
10.1080/13467581.2024.2329359
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
In recent years, the consortium, composed of the design enterprise, construction enterprise, and supplier, has witnessed rapid development in implementing the EPC project model in China. However, there are conflicts of interest and ambiguous safety management among EPC consortium members, leading to accidents. This study aims to explore the decision-making process regarding different safety behavior strategies among EPC consortium members. Given the uncertainty of the EPC project environment, consortium members show risk preferences and perceptual biases. Prospect theory reveals the irrational elements in the decision-making process. Therefore, this study incorporates prospect theory, constructs a safety behavior perception payoff matrix and an evolutionary game model involving design enterprise, construction enterprise, and supplier as the primary stakeholders, analyzes the interactive mechanisms of safety behavior among the three parties, and uses MATLAB simulation to explain the evolutionary path of behavioral strategies under varying parameters. The consequence indicates that the optimal strategy's stable state in the safety behavior evolution system of EPC consortium members is affected by the players' cognitive biases and risk preferences, and the costs of safety input, punishment intensity, and accident losses. This study mainly provides theoretical evidence and decision support for safety control activities among EPC consortium members.
引用
收藏
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] The Analysis on Evolutionary Game of Management Behavior of Food Safety Risks Based on Prospect Theory
    Qi, Duan
    [J]. 2019 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA SCIENCE AND BUSINESS ANALYTICS (ICDSBA 2019), 2019, : 3 - 6
  • [2] Stability Analysis of EPC Consortium Cooperation Based on Evolutionary Game
    Hu, Judan
    Yao, Yu
    Gao, Yuyang
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SEMANTIC WEB AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2024, 20 (01)
  • [3] Food safety evolutionary game simulation model based on improved prospect theory
    Han F.
    Li H.
    [J]. 1600, Taru Publications (20): : 1349 - 1354
  • [4] Simulation of EPC consortium partnership stability and data based on prospect theory
    Hu, Judan
    Tang, Shuang
    Yang, Minjie
    [J]. International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management, 2024, 38 (4-5) : 406 - 425
  • [5] Exploring the evolutionary game of rumor control based on prospect theory
    Zhao, Jinghua
    Lan, Ting
    Rong, Haiying
    Liu, Shanshan
    [J]. NEURAL COMPUTING & APPLICATIONS, 2023, 36 (17): : 9675 - 9685
  • [6] Research on the game of manufacturing capacity sharing based on prospect theory
    Tian-Yu Wang
    Hao Zhang
    [J]. Scientific Reports, 13
  • [7] Research on the game of manufacturing capacity sharing based on prospect theory
    Wang, Tian-Yu
    Zhang, Hao
    [J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 2023, 13 (01)
  • [8] Subjective Game Analysis on the Behavior of Safety Management in the High-Risk-System Based on Prospect Theory
    Zhang Yu
    Zhou Guo-hua
    Yang Shi-jun
    [J]. 2012 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE & ENGINEERING, 2012, : 332 - 337
  • [9] EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS FOR RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR SUPERVISION OF MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BASED ON PROSPECT THEORY
    Lv, Lelin
    Li, Huimin
    Wang, Zhuofu
    Zhang, Chengyi
    Qiao, Ran
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 2022, 28 (01) : 6 - 24
  • [10] Evolutionary game analysis of enterprise carbon emission regulation based on prospect theory
    Sun, Hao
    Gao, Guangkuo
    Li, Zonghuo
    [J]. SOFT COMPUTING, 2022, 26 (24) : 13357 - 13368