Environmental Regulation and Fiscal Revenue Growth: Is It Win-Win or Win-Lose?-Evidence of a Multi-Tasking Performance Evaluation System in China

Based on the samples of 207 prefecture-level cities in China from 2002 to 2010, this study uses the exogenous shock of China's first incorporation of environmental regulations into the assessment of local officials as a quasi-natural experiment, and applies the continuous difference-in-differences (DID) method to examine the impact of environmental regulation assessment pressure on local fiscal revenue. We find that the target pressure of environmental regulations for local officials has contributed to the growth of local fiscal revenue, and for each 0.01 increase in the targets of pollution emission reduction, local fiscal revenue increases by 0.204%. This result demonstrates a strong robustness. Our mechanism analysis further confirms that local governments employ various strategies to alleviate the financial burden induced by environmental regulations. These strategies include (1) not only adopting the "grabbing hand" approach, which involves extracting fiscal revenues from the market by reducing the fixed asset investment of local governments and enhancing the collection of pollution fees from enterprises, (2) but also utilizing the "helping hand" approach to augment financial resources, such as improving tax administration efficiency by cracking down on profit under-reporting and income tax evasion among enterprises. Moreover, the heterogeneity analysis suggests that the impact of environmental regulations on fiscal revenue is contingent upon the level of local fiscal self-sufficiency. This article offers empirical evidence to assist governments in devising effective environmental policies that aim to achieve a harmonious balance between economic growth and environmental protection.